Using a text-based measure as proxy for a firm's geographically dispersed business interests, we document that geographic dispersion increases the probability of failure risk for newly listed firms.
Introduction
Initial public offerings (IPOs) play an important role in the financial system, enabling companies to raise equity finance and contributing to growth for States of operations. The number of U.S. States that IPOs operate spreads all over the span. Although the fluctuation in IPO operations range is well expected the underlying impact of geographically distributed business interests are not well known.
Firms choose to expand operations to different areas, becoming more geographically dispersed, to access local resources, such as labor forces, market share, customers, and suppliers. Previous literature (i.e. Geo et al., 2008; Garcia and Norli, 2012; Giroud, 2013; Platikanova and Mattei, 2016; Addoum et al., 2017) has revealed that such business dispersion in different U.S. States influences corporate performance.
Specifically, Geo et al. (2008) argue that firms with divisions in different regions nationwide experience valuation discounts, because of higher agency problems among those firms. Garcia and Norli (2012) find that stock returns tend to be lower for geographically dispersed firms. Some studies also suggest that firms with spatially distributed business interests significantly affect corporate decisions. Landier et al. (2009) document that geographic dispersion raises issues around management decision-making in relation to internal human resources (e.g. employee dismissal) and investments (e.g. division divesture), which go against shareholder interests. Giroud (2013) indicates that firms prefer to build plants near their headquarters in order to perform closer monitoring and increase productivity. Moreover, geographically dispersed business interests have a negative impact on earnings forecasts due to the spatially distributed firm-specific information (e.g., Platikanova and Mattei, 2016; Addoum et al., 2017) . Nevertheless, those studies only address the short-term effects of corporate dispersion on firm performance. Thus, in this paper, we question whether geographically dispersed business interests have an impact on a firm's long-term performance, which involves mortality rates.
Our study focuses on the initial public offering (IPO) market because going public represents a transfer of ownership structure from the private to the public, which exposes firms to greater market risk and more rigorous scrutiny from investors and financial regulators. Moreover, managers in newly listed firms also experience enhanced challenges from the public capital market to make decisions that take more responsibility for a variety of market participants, including shareholders. Hence, the viability of public firms in periods subsequent to their IPO becomes particularly important. Fama and French (2004) report a significant delisting rate (44%) between 1980 and 1991 for firms in the first ten years after being newly listed due to poor corporate performance (see, for example, Ritter and Welch (2002) and Demers and Joos (2007) for similar findings). Evidence shows that a variety of firm and offering characteristics at the time of going public are deemed as important signals for a firm's future performance and therefore affect post-offering survival times, including venture capitalist participation (Jain and Kini, 2000) , strategic and cornerstone investors (Espenlaub et al., 2016) , and the CEO's working experience . However, the relationship between a firm's geographical characteristics and its post-IPO survival remains unexplored.
Thus, this study investigates the impact of a firm's geographic dispersion at the time of going public on its survivability in periods subsequent to the offering. We obtain a comprehensive sample of newly listed firms from 1994 to 2012 in the U.S. stock market. Following previous studies (e.g. Garcia and Norli, 2012; Platikanova and Mattei, 2016; Addoum et al., 2017) , we use a text-based measure by counting state names from the operations-related sections in the Form 10-K to proxy firms' geographically dispersed business interests. We construct a normalized Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to indicate to what extent a firm is geographically dispersed across different U.S. states at the time of going public. This study is focused on geographical dispersion in the U.S., which provides us with a comparatively more homogenous, within-country environment (e.g. in relation to political and regulatory considerations), and discounts additional risks stemming from overseas dispersion (e.g. international diversification).
Agency theory refers to the conflict of interests arising between an agent (e.g. managers) and the principal (e.g. shareholders) in which self-interested agents seek private benefits from either financial or non-financial incentives and eventually omit to maximize shareholder value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . In this study, we argue that geographic dispersion hampers information flow within the organization, which negatively affects management decision-making, thereby exacerbating agency conflicts and giving rise to poor corporate performance and IPO failure. Geographically dispersed firm-specific information results in a reduced ability for managers to completely summarize operating information (Addoum et al., 2017) , and increases information disparity between insiders and outsiders (Platikanova and Mattei, 2016) . Distance affects information quality when it is transferred between different locations (Petersen and Rajan, 2002) , and causes agency conflicts because of the low observability of managers' behaviors (John et al., 2011) . Thus, information asymmetry tends to be higher in geographically dispersed firms, which inherently increases internal and external monitoring costs. Shareholders may experience monitoring difficulties in those firms, resulting in moral hazard issues for managers in making decisions. Further, geographically dispersed firms face various challenges due to differing market conditions in states where firms have business interests. Managerial decision-making in geographically dispersed firms can be more flexible, depending on the operating environment (see, for example, Landier et al., 2009) . As a result, such firms feature more volatile operating environments, which aggravate the moral hazard problem (Smith and Watts, 1992; Himmelberg et al., 1999) . Managers who do not align with shareholder interests are likely to make inefficient decisions that result in IPO failure (see, for example, Gounopoulos and Pham, 2017) . Therefore, we should expect geographic dispersion to increase the probability of firm failure risk in the post-offering period.
We find strong evidence to support our conjecture. By implementing a Cox proportionalhazards (CPH) model, we reveal that more geographically dispersed firms are likely to fail and experience shorter survival times in periods subsequent to going public. When categorizing a firm by its degree of geographic dispersion, we find that lower levels of dispersion make it 0.756 times less likely that a firm will fail compared to a firm with higher levels of dispersion. The results are consistent when using nonparametric methodologies. Moreover, we document a similar negative geographic-dispersion effect when investigating a firm's post-IPO operating performance growth, which may serve as alternative evidence to explain the low survival rates among such firms.
We also reveal two additional effects of geographic dispersion on IPO survival. First, consistent with the notion that firms competing in the same states exhibit comparable information that enables shareholders to perform better monitoring and managers to make more efficient decisions, we find that IPO failure risks tend to be lower for firms with geographical similarities in the same industry. Second, we reveal that firms with spatially distributed business interests that are closely associated with local economic shocks experience lower failure risks, which indicates more efficient information collection and process analysis on their part.
We further explore possible mechanisms for the failure of geographically dispersed IPO firms.
Because of the evolution of information technologies in some industries (e.g. hard information environments), information collection increasingly relies on more impersonal means, which explains the increased distance between banks and the firms they service (Petersen and Rajan, 2002) . On the other hand, in a soft information environment, personal interactions dominate information processing, which makes the information more difficult to transfer and verify. Thus, geographically dispersed firms in a soft information setting experience greater information asymmetry because distance has a larger impact on information flow and the means of information acquisition (Petersen, 2004) .
Moreover, Landier et al. (2009) argue that information quality should be homogenous when the information is quantifiable (e.g. hard information). Hence, we should not expect there to be a link between IPO firm failure risk and geographical dispersion in firms operating in hard information environments. Conversely, consistent with the high information-asymmetry argument from previous studies (e.g., Platikanova and Mattei, 2016) , we find that the failure risks among dispersed newly listed firms are more pronounced in soft information environments. The evidence is consistent with our conjecture that information flow matters to geographically dispersed firms for survival in postoffering periods.
Because information collection in a soft information environment mainly relies on personal interactions, managerial decisions are more likely to be affected by social concerns. We find that geographically dispersed IPO firms are more likely to fail in small communities in a soft information setting. This result supports the argument that social factors affect managerial decision-making by affording more consideration to personal relationships, thereby exacerbating agency conflicts and corporate performance issues (Landier et al., 2009) . In more concentrated firms, shareholders can better monitor management behaviors and ameliorate such managerial social concerns. Taken together, the evidence is consistent with our hypothesis that information asymmetry causes agency conflicts in relation to managerial decision-making, resulting in IPO failures in geographically dispersed firms.
Finally, using a text-based measure to proxy the sizes of firms' headquarters, we reveal a positive relationship between the degree of business concentration around the headquarters location and post-IPO survival. Regardless of geographic dispersion, the evidence implies an important function for HQ size on firm performance, which is consistent with notions from previous studies (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1985; Hill et al., 1992; Collis et al., 2007) .
We make several contributions to geography and IPO-based literature. Previous studies document various negative impacts on firm performance stemming from geographic dispersion, including firm valuation discount (Gao et al., 2008) , lower stock returns (Garcia and Norli, 2012) , and biased and inaccurate earnings forecasts (Platikanova and Mattei, 2016) , and inefficient corporate decision-making (Landier et al., 2009) . To better understand how geographic dispersion affects corporate performance, we contribute to this stream of literature by addressing how newly listed firms with business interests heavily distributed across different U.S. states experience increased failure risk in the periods subsequent to the offering, with the ultimate consequence that firms are bankrupted or liquidated. To the best of our knowledge, we provide the first study to associate geography and corporate survival.
Previous studies focus on a variety of firm and offering characteristics that affect IPO survival, such as firm age, size, and risk factors (Hensler et al., 1997) , the participation of venture capitalists (Jain and Kini, 2000) , strategic and cornerstone investors (Espenlaub et al., 2016) , and CEO's working experience . However, it is unclear how geography affects the survivability of newly listed firms. In this regard, our results, using a novel dataset on firms' geographically distributed business interests, could help to explain a sizable portion of firm failures on the IPO market.
Our study is also closely related to the work of Landier et al. (2009) . They find that geographically dispersed firms are less employee-friendly as a result of information limitations in a soft information environment where information asymmetry is high, and managers make decisions according to their social standings in small communities that are potentially against shareholder interests. This study replicates their research design and updates their work to show that information constraints and managerial social concerns in geographically dispersed newly listed firms result in corporate failures.
Finally, our results produce several implications that are applicable in the financial marketplace. First, geographically dispersed firms are usually large in size (Garcia and Norli, 2012) , which draws investors' interests in the market. However, our results show that those dispersed firms exhibit a high tendency to failure in periods subsequent to going public. Thus, investors can reply on the observable factor of a firm's geographically dispersed business interests at the time of the offering event to anticipate the implications of corporate failure for further valuation. Second, even though rapid expansion of a business to different geographical areas brings some financial benefits to firms, such as gaining greater market share and achieving higher sales, managers and shareholders need to take the side effects into account. For instance, compromised information from remote business operations deflects managers' judgments from what might be rational, while closer proximity between headquarters and divisions enables managers to make more frequent trips to offer constructive advice for firm development (e.g. Giroud, 2013) . Newly listed firms can benefit from running more concentrated businesses, in which failure risks are likely to be reduced.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops our primary hypothesis, while Section 3 discusses the data and methodologies. Section 4 presents our primary findings, including robustness checks. Finally, Section 5 provides a conclusion to the study.
Geographic dispersion and IPO survival
As a background to diversification studies, Litov et al. (2012) argue that mixed information from industry diversification increases difficulties for analysts in evaluating a firm. Duru and Reeb (2002) document that international diversification increases information complexity, and is therefore associated with less accurate analyst forecasts. In a similar vein, Platikanova and Mattei (2016) reveal that the economic interests of firms that are geographically dispersed across different states in the U.S. increase information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. Operating information in geographically dispersed firms tends to be fragmentary, especially in historical financial performance records (Addoum et al., 2017) , because managers may not be able to collect dispersed business information efficiently. After all, a firm's spatially distributed business interests are often associated with geographically dispersed firm-specific information. Moreover, previous literature also suggests that market participants prefer to make geographically proximate investments for reasons associated with information disparity (see, for example, Coval and Moskowitz, 1999; Garmaise and Moskowitz, 2003) . Indeed, distance affects the means of information acquisition (Petersen and Rajan, 2002) , and therefore exacerbates the information asymmetry issue. Thus, geographic dispersion can compromise information quality when it requires transfer over a long distance. In the spirit of their work, we conjecture that firms with business interests geographically dispersed across different U.S. states experience greater information asymmetry problems within the organization.
The IPO market is characterized by high information asymmetry. For instance, newly listed firms are required by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to include up to three year's financial information in their prospectus. Thus, there is very limited knowledge about firm operations in their pre-IPO period. However, insiders have access to private information that is not publicly available to outsiders. In this scenario, managers have more incentives to seek private benefits and omit shareholder objectives when making decisions for the firm. For instance, managers could manipulate the financial report in order to deceive shareholders, which could result in severe damage to the firm. Consequently, a conflict of interests exists between the principal (e.g. shareholders) and the agent (e.g. firm managers), which will result in agency problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . Bertrand and Schoar (2003) document that managerial decisions affect firm performance and behavior. In terms of alleviating agency problems, Gounopoulos and Pham (2017) find that specialist CEOs who are more likely to pursue shareholder objectives significantly reduce mortality rates for newly listed firms. Thus, a manager's decision is a determinant of a firm's future.
In our study, we argue that in the face of the high information asymmetry that stems from geographically distributed business interests, managers are likely to make decisions that are against shareholder interests, potentially impacting on corporate performance and leading to IPO firm failures.
A firm's geographic diversification is associated with high information complexity (Duru and Reeb, 2002; Denis et al., 2002) , which affects the quality and quantity of information exchange between management and investors (Jennings et al., 2013) . Moreover, the expansion of business operations and the raised level of information asymmetry, in turn, increase internal and external monitoring costs (Gao et al., 2008) . John et al. (2011) argue that distance can cause an agency problem, because shareholders cannot observe managers' behaviors remotely. Thus, managers from geographically dispersed firms face a moral hazard problem when making managerial decisions because of monitoring challenges, which could lead to more severe agency conflicts.
Furthermore, firms with operations in multiple states face a variety of challenges, such as local market competition, local economic conditions, and diverse political and regulatory influences. Smith (2016) documents that local political corruption affects firms' financial policies. His study implies that managers may behave differently in making decisions depending on the operating environment in which the firm has business interests. Thus, decision-making in geographically dispersed firms is required to be more flexible. In this regard, Landier et al. (2009) document that managerial decisions in such firms could be made according to a manager's social standing, which is potentially against the principle of maximization of shareholder value. As a result, spatially distributed business interests enable managers to enjoy discretion in operations, including moving income between different areas of the U.S. (e.g. Dyreng et al., 2013) . Therefore, geographically dispersed firms feature more volatile operating environments, which will exacerbate moral hazard issues associated with management decisions (Smith and Watts, 1992; Himmelberg et al., 1999) .
During the process of going public, firms raise a large amount of capital to facilitate different purposes, such as financing further investments or accessing additional market sources. If a firm's business is highly geographically dispersed across different U.S. states at the time of going public, the firm is more likely to maintain ongoing investment and operational expansion after the offering.
One source of firm expansion is through merger and acquisition (M&A) activities, because many firms take advantage of going public to expedite future M&As (e.g. Celikyurt et al., 2010) .
Consequently, the information asymmetry problem between managers and shareholders could remain longer in the subsequent periods after the public offerings, which is likely to divert managerial incentives away from maximizing shareholder benefits and result in poor corporate performance. On the basis of these arguments, we should expect that firms with geographically dispersed business interests at the time of going public are negatively associated with post-IPO survival.
Data and methodology

IPO data
We collected the share information of common stocks in the U. bankruptcy, insufficient capital, failure to meet financial regulation, or delinquent in filings), rather than delisting motives with less harmful impacts on investors (e.g. M&A). Therefore, the failed firms in our sample are those with a code equal to or greater than 300.
Measuring geographic dispersion
We measure the geographically dispersed business interests of newly listed firms using the content of 10-K forms (an annual report required by the U.S. SEC) retrieved from the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) database. This approach has been widely examined and accepted by previous studies (e.g. Garcia and Norli, 2012; Bernile et al., 2015; Platikanova and Mattei, 2016; Addoum et al., 2017; Smajlbegovic 2018 and Addoum et al. (2017) confirm that these four sections outline a firm's geographically diversified operating activities, such as properties and equipment, store and office locations, and M&A activities, that are associated with stock and corporate performances. Moreover, this method of measuring firms' spatially distributed business interests can avoid the problem of firms not disclosing accounting numbers by state (Garcia and Norli, 2012) . We merge our data with that of Garcia and Norli (2012) 3 to improve data availability and reliability. Ultimately, our sample of 2,432 IPOs with valid information comprises 507 survivors, 1,201 acquired firms, and 724 failed firms.
In our sample, the most frequently mentioned states in the 10-K forms are California (9.71%), Delaware (8.4%), and New York (5.99%), and the least frequently cited states are Vermont (0.34%), South Dakota (0.33%), and North Dakota (0.31%). Because many firms are incorporated in Delaware or Washington, these two states are likely to be outliers in our analysis. In unreported results, we show that our findings are robust when these two states are excluded.
Following Platikanova and Mattei (2016) , we measure the level of a firm's geographic dispersion by computing a normalized Herfindahl-Hirschman index:
where SSi, (IPO year) 
Methodology
Survival analysis has been widely applied to predict events such as bank and corporate failures, employee turnover (Somers, 1996) , and venture capitalists' participation in firms and subsequent M&As after IPOs (Gill and Walz, 2016) . Previous studies also use survival analysis to investigate the determinants of post-IPO firm failures (e.g. Kini, 2000, 2008; Espenlaub et al., 2016; . Compared to conventional econometrical models (e.g. logistic or probit regressions) that only predict the occurrence of an event, survival analysis is capable of incorporating time horizon factors before the event occurs, and also taking censored observations into account. An observation is treated as censored if the event has not yet taken place during the study period. Thus, our sample is right-censored because many IPO firms continued to trade after the end of the tracking period (e.g. 31 December 2017). In addition, the time horizon window is different for each firm depending on the time that the IPO occurred. For example, we track a firm that went public in 2005
for ten years, but if it went public in 2010 we only track it for seven.
Our analysis of the relationship between geographic dispersion and a newly listed firm's survival involves two stages. We first use nonparametric approaches: by implementing a survival function, we are able to assess the newly listed firm's survival probability up to a specific time. The
Kaplan-Meier survival function is presented as:
where indicates the time when an IPO firm's delisting occurs, is the number of surviving IPOs before the time , and is the number of failed IPOs at time . We use a log-rank test to examine whether the survival functions are significantly different between different groups of firms distinguished by their geographic-dispersion levels.
In the main analysis that follows, we implement parametric approaches that include the Cox proportional-hazards (CPH) model. The CPH procedure combines a hazard model and a maximum partial likelihood estimation process (David, 1972) . The advantage of using the CPH model is that it does not need the hazard function to be pre-specified and can take any function form (Allison, 2010).
We estimate the Cox proportional-hazards model as follows: 
where ℎ 0 ( ) is the hazard function; the dependent variable is the hazard ratio relating to firm failure risk. A positive (or negative) coefficient implies that the IPO firm is more (or less) likely to be delisted in the future; likewise, the corresponding survival time is shorter (or longer). For each of the control variables, the hazard ratio is calculated as an exponentiated coefficient, which indicates the probability of firm failure risk. For binary variables, the hazard ratio is served as the ratio of estimated hazard for those with value 1 to that of those with value 0. For continuous variables, the change of estimated hazard for a unit increase in the covariate is measured as 100× (hazard ratio-1) Allison, 2010) . Moreover, adopting the CPH regression requires that the model is proportional hazards, which indicates that any two variables display the ratios of hazards that are proportional over time. In unreported results, we conduct relevant test and ensure that our CPH models used in the study meet the proportional hazards assumption.
The variable of interest is a firm's geographic dispersion related measure. We incorporate into the analysis control variables that are found to have an impact on IPO survival. First, we include variables Proceeds, Sales, and Firm age, because large firms (or firms with a longer operating history)
reduce information asymmetry and have less valuation uncertainty, and therefore lower IPO failure risk (Hensler et al., 1997; Demers and Joos, 2007) . Moreover, some studies document that the participation of financial intermediaries in newly listed firms also improves post-IPO survival profile.
Specifically, top-tier underwriters and auditors play a certification role in reducing firms' specific risks and the information disparity between offerings and investors during the process of going public, thereby lowering post-IPO failure risks (e.g. Schultz, 1993; Carter et al., 1998; Weber and Willenborg, 2003; Corwin and Schultz, 2005) . Moreover, venture capitalists (VCs) add value to the portfolios of firms by exercising intensive monitoring through their expertise in the industry and board positions, which improves corporate performance (e.g. Brav and Gompers, 1997; Hellmann and Puri, 2002; Krishnan et al., 2011) . Jain and Kini (2000) reveal a positive relationship between VC involvement and IPO survival. We, therefore, consider these information-reducing and value-adding intermediaries by incorporating the variables Venture capital, Underwriter, and Auditor in the analysis. Furthermore, IPO initial returns may be used as a signal of the quality of issuers (Welch, 1989) . Thus, we follow Demers and Joos (2007) in controlling this effect by incorporating Initial return in the study. We also control for other financial characteristics of firms at the time of going public, including Leverage, Profitability and Market-to-book (e.g. growth opportunities) (see, for example, Gounopoulos and Pham, 2017) . We report a correlation matrix of the variables used in our study in Appendix B and find no evidence of multicollinearity. Definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix A. 1997, and 2008 . In Panel C, we note that health services and chemical products industries account respectively for the highest (33.33%) and lowest (9.84%) percentages of firm failures.
Data description
Entertainment services, wholesale and retail trade, and transportation and public utilities exhibit relatively high delisting rates, ranging from 25.49% to 29.03%. Moreover, in our sample, firms in the entertainment services industry are the most likely to be acquired (33.33%), and firms in the health services industry are the least likely to be acquired (19.05%). In the majority of industries, more than 50 percent of firms survived five years after going public.
[Please insert Table 1 about here]
In Table 2 , we report Kaplan-Meier survival rates for subgroups of firms up to five years after [Please insert Table 2 about here] with average leverage and market-to-book ratios of 0.34 and 6.095, respectively. IPO firms report a mean profitability ratio of -0.048, which is consistent with the argument that firms prefer to go public before generating positive profits from 1990s . This finding is also close to the figure recorded by previous studies (e.g. Gounopoulos and Pham, 2017) . Finally, on average, firms operate in 1.704 industries and 0.808 foreign countries (e.g., outside the U.S.) at the time of going public.
A majority of firm and offering characteristics exhibit significant differences between low-and high-concentration firms, exceptions being market-to-book ratio and international segments (Intl.SEG). IPO firms with more concentrated business interests are younger than firms with less concentrated ones (11.658 years vs. 14.617 years). In addition, less geographically dispersed firms experience lower initial returns than firms with highly dispersed business interests (25.035% vs.
31.677%). This finding potentially supports our informational argument that geographic dispersion gives rise to information asymmetry, because previous studies present the general notion that asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders results in higher initial returns (e.g. Levis, 1990; Loughran and McDonald, 2013; Bajo and Raimondo, 2017) . Less concentrated firms raise nearly double the capital during the process of going public than highly concentrated firms ($136.259 million vs. $73.194 million) . In addition, the average sales for firms with lightly concentrated business interests are 50 percent above those of firms with highly concentrated business interests ($380.112 million vs. $181.626 million). This evidence implies that geographically dispersed firms are usually larger in size, which supports the argument of Garcia and Norli (2012) .
Furthermore, IPO firms in the two groups show evidence of different financial policies.
Specifically, the average leverage ratio for lightly concentrated firms is greater than highly concentrated ones (0.374 vs. 0.307), which is consistent with our argument that managers may make different decisions depending on the operating environment (e.g. according to the level of a firm's geographic dispersion). The mean market-to-book ratio is 6.427 for firms with lightly concentrated business interests, and 5.764 for firms with highly concentrated interests. Moreover, VCs are more likely to invest in highly concentrated firms than lightly concentrated ones (54.2% vs. 43.4%); one possible reason is that VCs can better monitor and screen a portfolio if the firm is less geographically dispersed, resulting in proximity investment preference (see, for example, Lerner, 1995) . Firms with lower business concentrations show a higher preference for hiring reputable investment banks and auditors (41% and 69.2%, respectively) than firms with high business concentrations (34.5% and 66.5%, respectively). On average, lightly concentrated firms are more diversified than highly concentrated ones in terms of the industry and international segments in which they operate. Lastly, regarding the IPO failure, significantly greater portion of firms with lightly concentrated business are delisted due to negative reasons within the first five years after the offering than that of firms with highly concentrated business (21.4% and 17.2%, respectively).
[Please insert Table 3 about here] 4. Empirical analysis of firms' geographical dispersion on IPO survival
Survival analysis of geographically dispersed IPO firms (CPH model)
We now estimate variants of Equation 4 to investigate the impact of geographic dispersion on IPO firms' survivorship, after controlling for various firm and offering characteristics that are related to the probability of IPO failure risk. In order to control for unobserved effects on the delisting of IPO firms (e.g. financial crisis years), we incorporate year and industry effects in all regression analyses in which coefficients are suppressed. The results of the estimations from the CPH model are tabulated in Table 4 in the form of four specifications.
In specification (1), we first use our state-citation-based HHI measure (Concentration), which indicates the degree of geographical dispersion in an IPO firm. The coefficient for the variable of interest is -0.563, at a significance level of 1 percent, implying a strong negative relationship between the level of an IPO firm's business concentration and its post-offering failure risk. In other words, more geographically dispersed business interests (i.e. distributed across more states) in a newly listed firm significantly increase the hazard of being delisted and decrease survival times in post-offering periods. The hazard ratio of 0.569 implies that a one-unit increase in Concentration is associated with a 43.1% reduction in the risk of failure in periods subsequent to the offering. In specification (2), the coefficient for High-concentration firms is -0.279 and is statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting that highly geographically dispersed IPO firms are more likely to experience failure compared to their counterparts with less dispersed business interests. The hazard ratio of Highconcentration firms suggests that lower levels of geographic dispersion in firms make it 0.756 times less likely that such firms will fail relative to firms with higher levels of geographic dispersion.
In specification (3), we present the analysis using the degree of geographic similarity for a newly listed firm within the same industry. Higher values of variable GEOSIMILAR imply that an IPO firm's business interests across U.S. states are similar to those of their industry competitors. Platikanova and Mattei (2016) document that analysts' precision is increased in a given state if more firms in the same industry share geographically similar economic activities, because the cost of collecting information is reduced. In a similar vein, we expect that such lower-cost information collection processes may also be applied to alleviate potential agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. One explanation could be that, for instance, shareholders may more easily identify the advantages and disadvantages of operating in a given state by comparing information from competitors, and can thereby more readily direct managers to take actions to improve corporate performance.
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Next, in specification (4), we consider the effect on corporate failure of firm's geographically dispersed business interests related local economic shocks. Higher values of GEOCORR indicate that the IPO firm either operates in one state only, or that its operations in multiple states are closely correlated with local economic disturbance(s). The integrity of operations in different states that are closely correlated with local shocks enables firms to have better access to local resources, including customers, suppliers, and local regulators, among many others. In such circumstances, we expect that insiders can collect and analyse information more efficiently from closely correlated states in which the firm has business interests. Therefore, we conjecture that geographically dispersed IPO firms that are closely tied in to local shocks are less likely to experience failure.
In specification (3) of Table 4 , we find a negative coefficient (-0.751) for GEOSIMILAR, at a highly significant level of 1 percent. This result is consistent with the conjecture that firms sharing geographically dispersed business interests with industry counterparts experience lower failure risk, 5 Our argument is similar to that of De Franco et al. (2011) , which finds that comparable accounting information among different firms lowers information asymmetry and improves information quality and quantity between insiders and outsiders (e.g., analysts).
because there is more comparable information in the marketplace. In specification (4), we observe that the variable GEOCORR displays a negative sign (-0.548) and is statistically significant at the 1% level. This finding provides evidence that IPO firms are less likely to fail if their geographically dispersed business interests are closely associated with local economic shocks. Given the hazard ratios for GEOSIMILAR and GEOCORR of 0.472 and 0.578, respectively, a one-unit increase in GEOSIMILAR indicates that IPO failure risk decreases by 52.8% (42.2% in the case of a similar rise in GEOCORR).
[Please insert Table 4 about here]
A majority of our control variables display the expected signs and significance at conventional levels. Specifically, we find that offering factors such as longer operating history, the raising of more proceeds, and larger firm size (e.g., higher sales) significantly extend survival times for IPO firms, which is consistent with findings from Hensler et al. (1997) and Demers and Joos (2007) . Moreover, the participation of financial intermediaries, including venture capitalists and reputable underwriters, also contributes to better survival profiles (e.g. Jain and Kini, 2000) . Firms with high leverage are associated with shorter survival times in the periods after IPO, as per Gounopoulos and Pham (2017) .
Finally, in line with , firms survive longer if they have higher profitability and better market-to-book ratio at the time of going public.
Overall, the results support the earlier findings from the use of nonparametric approaches, shown in Table 2 . That is, a higher level of geographic dispersion in an IPO firm increases the probability of failure risk and reduces survival times in periods subsequent to the offering, which is aligned with our primary hypothesis.
Geographic dispersion and IPO survival: Information and social concern
In this section, we replicate the research design of Landier et al. (2009) to address how the information environment and managerial social concerns affect the survival of geographically dispersed IPO firms.
Information environment
Petersen (2004) suggests that information transmission performs differently depending on the information environment. Specifically, he argues that some information is quantifiable (e.g.
accounting figures) and is easy to store and transfer through advanced means (e.g. technologies such as email), which is characterized as hard information. On the other hand, the collection and processing of soft information (e.g. rumors) mainly relies on personal interaction, and is difficult to completely summarize and verify over distance 6 . Such an information mechanism explains the increasing distances between lenders and borrowers, as bankers more readily lend to remotely located firms when relevant information can be rendered harder or more impersonal 7 . Therefore, a soft information environment features higher information asymmetry than a hard one.
Because distance affects the means of information acquisition, we should expect that geographically dispersed firms will experience higher information asymmetry when operating in a softer information environment. Managers may experience greater difficulties in obtaining information from spatially distributed business interests in support of precise decisions, and shareholders may also find that it is not easy to observe management behaviors remotely in such an information setting. Conversely, firms with greater business concentrations enjoy better withinorganization information flow and more intensive monitoring from shareholders, which should be less affected by the type of information environment in operation. After all, less dispersed business interests provide firms with better communication channels. Moreover, Landier et al. (2009) suggest that information quality should remain unchanged when that information is quantifiable, regardless of distance factors. On the basis of the discussion above, we expect the low survivability among geographically dispersed firms to be more prominent in a soft information setting.
To examine this conjecture, we collect data on the distance between firms and financial institutions from the National Survey of Small Business Finance before calculating the average change in this distance between survey years at the two-digit industry level 8 . We define firms as operating in a soft information environment if the mean distance change is below the median value, and in a hard information environment otherwise. The results are tabulated in Table 5 .
In specification (1), we introduce an interaction term between the level of geographic concentration (Concentration) and our measure of the information environment in a firm's industry (Soft information) to our CPH model of IPO survival. We find a negative coefficient (significant at the 5% level) for Concentration*Soft information, which suggests that the level of a firm's geographic dispersion is positively associated with failure risk if the firm operates in a soft information environment. This result supports empirical evidence from previous studies that documents a relationship between information asymmetry issues and different information settings. For instance, 6 An example is that the variation of stock price could depend on the informal market observations that constitute soft information, rather than the hard information conveyed by official means (e.g. financial reports, earnings calls) (see, for example, Loughran and Schultz (2005) ).
7 Berger et al. (2005) find that large banks prefer to lend to more distant firms because lenders take advantage of technologies to communicate with customers in a hard information environment. Similar evidence can also be found in Petersen and Rajan (2002) . 8 The survey report is only available for the years 1987, 1993, 1998, and 2003 . Our approach to measures of soft and hard information environments is similar to that of Landier et al. (2009) and Platikanova and Mattei (2016) . Platikanova and Mattei (2016) show that earnings forecasts for geographically dispersed firms are less accurate in an environment where information cannot be made impersonal at low cost (i.e. soft information), which points to high information disparity between insiders and outsiders. Thus, we reveal the importance of the information environment in determining the survival of geographically dispersed newly listed firms, which partially supports our hypothesis.
[Please insert Table 5 about here]
Managerial social concern
Landier et al. (2009) suggest that managerial decisions could be made on the basis of personal social standing. They find that managers are more likely to protect employees in small communities, for avoidance of embarrassment and/or other selfish motivations. Such social concerns are likely to divert managers away from managerial incentives and increase moral hazard issues. For instance, when a firm seeks a supplier, managers in small communities may prefer to cooperate with acquaintances (e.g. friends, family members) rather than selecting the most appropriate partner (e.g.
through quality matching). Because the information collection process in a soft information environment mainly relies on personal interactions, we explore how social concerns affect survival profiles of geographically dispersed IPO firms within such settings.
Our social concern measure derives from the finding of Landier et al. (2009) that community size can influence a manager's decision-making. To capture this social effect on managerial decisions in relation to the survivability of geographically dispersed IPO firms, we first collect the county names in which firms' headquarters are located according to the addresses and zip codes obtained from Compustat. Next, we gather population data for each such county from the U.S. Census Bureau.
We define a firm as being in a large community if the local population is above the sample median (701,080), and small if it is below. The community size is expected to capture the potential agency conflicts between managers and shareholders.
We divide our sample on the basis of small and large community sizes, as shown in Table 5 .
We observe that the coefficient for the interaction term Concentration*Soft information appears negative and significant at the 5% level in specification (2), which suggests that geographic dispersion increases IPO firms' failure risk in a soft information environment only when a firm's headquarters is located in a county with a small population. We do not find such evidence in which firms operate in a hard information environment, in specification (3). Our results are less likely to be attributable to the costs of information collection in less or more populated counties, otherwise we should also find similar evidence in large communities.
Overall, the results offer important implications in relation to geographic dispersion and firm survival. First, we show that geographically dispersed IPO firms are more likely to fail in a soft information environment, which is consistent with our information asymmetry argument. Second, the empirical evidence from small communities is consistent with the view of Landier et al. (2009) that managerial social concerns affect management decision-making, potentially in opposition to the objective of maximizing shareholder value. Thus, our hypothesis that geographically dispersed firms experience greater internal information asymmetry that negatively affects managerial decisions, leading to a higher probability of failure in post-IPO periods, is upheld.
Post-IPO performance
Because we conjectured that managers in geographically dispersed firms are more likely to make decisions against shareholder interests and give rise to post-IPO failure, it is natural to examine whether such behavior can be related to a firm's operating performance in post-IPO periods.
Our measure used to proxy the post-IPO operating performance is the operating return on assets, which is the ratio of operating income before depreciation to total assets (e.g., Jain and Kini (1994) ). This variable captures to what extent a firm is efficient in converting the capital it invests into net income; a high value indicates that a firm generates more profit with less investment. The method we adopted to identify the matching firm is similar to that of Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) and Banerjee et al. (2016) . Specifically, we match each IPO firm in our sample with an industry peer (at the 3-digit SIC code) based on the comparable sales and EBITDA profit margins, where the EBITDA profit margin is defined as the ratio of EBITDA to sales. For the matching firm, we apply the following restrictions: 1) the firm has been trading at least three years at the time of issuer's initial public offering; 2) a stock price is no less than $5 in the same fiscal year that the IPO firm starts trading in the market. 3) firms are ordinary shares, and exclude closed-end funds, unit offerings, REITs, ADRs, LBOs, and financial institutions. During the matching process, we use the next available matching firm if any firm has a missing accounting value in a particular fiscal year, but the IPO firm's accounting information is available in the same year. We calculate the growth of the IPO firm's post-operating performance as the change of operating return on assets between the offering year and year y less the corresponding change for the matching firm. Because of the matching restrictions, accounting data availability from Compustat, and the IPO's listing status, our sample drops and varies between different post-offering years. We include all control variables from the baseline regression analysis as well as year and industry dummies whose coefficients are suppressed for brevity. The results are tabulated in Table 6 .
First, in Panel A, we use univariate analysis to compare the post-IPO performance growth for each of our subsamples: low and high business concentration firms. We find that IPO firms with more concentrated business consistently outperform counterparts with less concentrated business in three years subsequent to the offering, and the differences are highly significant at the 1% level. Further, over the first year of listing, both subsamples of firms are associated with the operating performance growth that is on average higher than the performance of matched firms. However, staring in the second year, we observe that firms with less concentrated business experience declined operating performance growth compared to IPO year; while firms with more concentrated business enjoy continuously positive growth. The OLS regressions confirm those results in Panel B, where we regress the growth of operating return on assets on the firm's geographic dispersion measures.
Specifically, the coefficients on Concentration and High CONC are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting that the growth of an IPO firm's ability to generate profits based on their investments increases with decreasing levels of geographic dispersion.
Overall, the evidence supports our hypothesis that a firm's geographically dispersed business interests degrade firm performance, and promote post-IPO failure.
[Please insert Table 6 about here]
Additional test: Firm headquarters size
A firm's headquarters takes responsibility for allocating resources to geographically dispersed business units, including labor, R&D funds, and manufacturing equipment. Divisions, therefore, perform activities and tasks according to the orders received from headquarters. Further, a welldefined control system adopted by an HQ to monitor and screen division activities reduces agency costs (Eisenhardt, 1985) . Therefore, the corporate headquarters is important to financial and managerial performance because it has decision-making, coordinating and value-adding functions within the organization (e.g. Chandler, 1991; Collis et al., 2007) . Because the magnitude of the headquarters matters to its fundamental roles (Hill et al., 1992) , we specifically evaluate the importance of headquarters size to survival profiles of geographically dispersed IPO firms.
We take advantage of our state-count data to construct a variable HQ% by using the citation share of the headquarters state relative to all other relevant states as a proxy for the magnitude of the HQ. Larger values of HQ% indicate higher levels of business concentration in the headquarters state.
This variable provides us with a clear picture of the extent of an IPO firm's operational concentration at the headquarters location, regardless of the level of geographical dispersion. The results are tabulated in Table 7 .
[Please insert Table 7 about here]
We find that the coefficient for the variable of interest HQ% is -0.402 and is significant at the 5% level, indicating that IPO firms with a higher percentage of business concentration around the headquarters location are associated with lower probabilities of failure. The hazard ratio of 0.669
indicates that a one-unit increase in HQ% is associated with a 33.1% reduction in post-offering failure risks. This finding is consistent with the notion that the size of corporate headquarters plays a dominant role in firm performance, which supports previous studies (e.g. Hill et al., 1992) .
Robustness tests 4.5.1 Control for high-tech firms
High-tech firms are usually young and associated with more growth opportunities. Thus, they feature higher risks than others and are also more likely to engender greater agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. Moreover, such firms tend to have more intangible assets (e.g. patents, trademarks), which may be less affected by geographical dispersal of business interests. Therefore, we investigate whether the impact of a firm's geographic dispersion on IPO survival is a result of differing industries (e.g. high-tech vs. non-high-tech). In specification (1) of Table 8 , we observe that the coefficient for Concentration is negative and significant at the 5% level, which is consistent with the evidence from the baseline analysis that geographic dispersion is negatively associated with IPO survival. The coefficient for the interaction term Concentration*High-tech is not statistically significant, suggesting that the impact of a firm's geographic dispersion on IPO survival is not dependent on whether or not the firm operates in a high-tech industry. In specifications (2) and (3),
we conduct an analysis of the high-tech and non-high-tech industries subgroups by dividing our sample on this basis. As expected, the variable Concentration consistently displays negative and significant signs, confirming that geographic dispersion increases the level of IPO failure risk. A oneunit increase in Concentration decreases IPO failure risk by 50.3% for high-tech firms, and by 39%
for non-high-tech firms.
[Please insert Table 8 about here]
Endogeneity control
In this section, we first question whether the impact of an IPO firm's geographic dispersion is driven by other corporate diversification factors rather than by within-country geographic dispersion.
International diversification could expose firms to additional risks, such as fluctuations in exchange rates, localized policy variations, and foreign country regulations (Duru and Reeb, 2002 Table 9 , the sign of the coefficient for Concentration is consistent with previous findings and statistically significant at the 5% level. The evidence suggests that geographic dispersion positively affects firm failure risk in post-IPO periods, and is not attributable to systematic risks and additional issues stemming from other corporate diversifications.
[Please insert Table 9 about here] Second, the t-tests shown earlier (e.g., in Table 10 , the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) is -0.074 with a significance level of 5%, suggesting more geographically concentrated IPO firms experience lower failure risks than their less concentrated counterparts. These findings are consistent with the results of the previous analysis.
[Please insert Table 10 about here]
Alternative measures of a firm's geographic dispersion
We consider alternative measures of geographic dispersion in this section. We first construct a variable NState by simply counting the number of different states in which a firm has business interests at the time of going public. Following Gao et al. (2008) , we then categorize in how many U.S. geographical regions an IPO firm has business activities. The variable Region is a count indicator ranging from one to nine in our sample. Further, because Garcia and Norli (2012) report that localized firms outperform dispersed ones in terms of stock returns, we follow their study and define the variable Local, which takes a value of 1 if the IPO firm has geographically dispersed business interests in one or two states, and is otherwise 0. The results from specifications (1) to (3) shown in Table 11 continue to support our hypothesis that geographic dispersion negatively relates to IPO survival.
Furthermore, geographically dispersed firms with operations in different states can exhibit distinct financial performance as a result of local economic conditions (e.g. Platikanova and Mattei, 2016) . We use the gross domestic product (GDP) at the state level to construct a GDP-weighted HHI for firms' geographical dispersion. The variable Concentration(GDP) is expected to capture the effect of economic factors in the local state on the post-IPO performance of dispersed firms. In specification (4) of Table 11 , we find a negative coefficient that is significant at the 5% level, suggesting that firms with more concentrated business interests are less likely to fail in post-IPO periods.
Firms are required to report major subsidiaries in Exhibit 21 of Form 10-K. Following Dyreng et al. (2013), we hand-collect the number of an IPO firm's subsidiaries from the corresponding reports used in our study. We then merge our data with their database provided by Dyreng et al. (2013) to increase the sample size 9 . We further require that each such firm has at least one subsidiary in the year of going public (e.g. Addoum et al., 2017) , which eventually generates 1087 valid observations 10 .
We take advantage of the state information about firm subsidiaries in Exhibit 21 to compute an HHI and use this as an alternative measure of geographic dispersion. In specification (5) of Table 11 , we find a negative relationship between the level of a firm's subsidiary geographical concentration and IPO failure risk, the coefficient being -0.351 and significant at the 10% level.
Overall, we show that the results from our preceding analysis are robust to alternative measures of geographic dispersion.
[Please insert Table 11 about here] 9 We thank Dyreng for providing the data, which is available from his website.
Other sensitivity checks
Welbourne and Andrews (1996) report that firms suffer from stock price declines around acquisitions and the acquired firms experience financial distress. In our main analysis, we classify failed firms as those that are delisted for adverse reasons (e.g. bankruptcy). In the spirit of Welbourne and Andrews, we redefine failed firms by also including those that are delisted because of M&As (i.e.
delisting codes between 200 and 299). Moreover, we also follow previous studies (e.g. and exclude acquired firms from the sample. We rerun our tests with these two restrictions on the definition of failed firms and find similar results to those in Table 4 .
We also consider alternative analysis approaches. We first use an Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) model. Unlike the CPH model, the exponential of the coefficient for each independent variable in the AFT approach is the time ratio, known as an "acceleration factor" (Espenlaub et al., 2016) . A time ratio greater than 1 indicates that the variable factor increases the survival time (less than 1 that it decreases it). Further, using the AFT approach requires a specific distribution for the model. The
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) test is used to determine the appropriate distribution for nonnested models, such as the log-logistic and lognormal distributions (e.g. Espenlaub et al., 2016) . Thus, we select the lognormal distribution because the AIC test shows it to have the lowest value. Moreover, we use the logit model to explore the likelihood of the occurrence of IPO failure. Finally, we only consider IPO firm's delisting caused by any negative reasons for up to five years after the offering.
The results are consistent with our main findings that the level of geographic dispersion is negatively related to the survival profile of newly listed firms. The results of these alternative analyses are tabulated in Appendixes C, D, and E. Finally, we use CPH, AFT, and logit models to replicate our baseline regression by considering state fix effect. The results displayed in Appendix F confirm our main findings that are not affected by the state-specific shocks.
Conclusion
In this study, we examine the impact of geographic dispersion on an IPO firm's survivability.
We argue that managers from geographically dispersed firms suffer from receiving information in which quality is compromised, and are therefore more likely to make decisions that are against shareholder objectives and cause agency conflicts. Ultimately, such decisions will be detrimental to corporate performance.
We use a unique text-based dataset from the Form 10-Ks released in the issuing year to measure an IPO firm's geographic dispersion. Based on the state citations, we construct a normalized HHI to serve as an indicator of the firm's geographically dispersed business interests. Through application of survival analysis, we document that geographic dispersion significantly escalates firm failure risk and shortens survival time in post-offering periods. Further, we find that geographically similar firms and firms with dispersed business interests that are closely associated with local economic shocks are less likely to fail.
We also explore the mechanisms that might affect the survival profile of geographically dispersed IPO firms. First, consistent with our conjecture that geographic dispersion causes information asymmetry, our empirical evidence reveals that dispersed IPO firms are more likely to fail when information is difficult to transfer and verify remotely (e.g. soft information). Second, we find that geographically diversified firms in small communities where social concerns may drive managerial decision-making are negatively associated with survivability in post-offering periods. The evidence suggests that information asymmetry and manager's decision-making are important factors in the survival profiles of geographically dispersed IPO firms. Finally, we document a negative relationship between firms with spatially distributed business interests and operating performance in post-IPO periods, which implies that geographic dispersion degrades corporate performance and may help to explain newly listed firm failure rates.
Our study contributes to the literature that investigates the association between geography and firm performance. In particular, it contributes to IPO studies by revealing that a firm's geographically dispersed business interests across different U.S. states serve as a significant determinant of a newly listed firm's post-IPO survival. Importantly, this study provides new insights to corporate performance which suggests firms should stay concentrated when running businesses in order to survive longer. Table 1 IPO distribution The table displays the distribution of IPO listing status for our sample. The sample includes newly listed firms in the US stock market from 1994 to 2012. Delisting status is tracked for five years after IPO by year (Panel B) and industry (Panel C). Survived firms are defined as those continuing to trade at the end of our tracking period (CRSP delisting code is 100); acquired firms are those that are delisted for reasons such as M&A (CRSP delisting codes between 200 and 299); failed firms are those that are delisted for negative reasons, such as bankruptcy and liquidation (CRSP delisting codes equal to or above 300). All others (01, 12, 15, 17, 22-27, 29, 37, 39, 72, 75, 82, 87, 96) Table 2 Kaplan-Meier survival rates stratified by IPO firm business concentration levels The table displays the results of survival analysis for IPO firms from 1994 to 2012 for five years after listing using a KaplanMeier nonparametric approach. Panel A divides the sample into low and high business concentration groups: firms are assigned to the high-concentration group if the HHI-based geographic-dispersion measure is above the median value; and the low-concentration group otherwise. Panel B divides the sample into quartiles according to business concentration levels (25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%). We track firm's status up to five years after listing. Surviving firms are defined as those continuing to trade at the end of tracking period (CRSP delisting code 100); acquired firms are those delisted for reasons such as M&A (CRSP delisting codes between 200 and 299); failed firms are those delisted for negative reasons, such as bankruptcy and liquidation (CRSP delisting codes equal to or above 300). A log-rank test is used to assess the statistical significance of differences between survival functions across concentration levels. Table 3 Descriptive statistics The table displays the descriptive statistics for the sample. The sample includes newly listed firms in the US stock market from 1994 to 2012. Panel A reports firm's geographical characteristics, and Panel B reports firm and IPO characteristics. A t-test is conducted to compare differences in means between two subsamples of IPO firms with low and high levels of geographically dispersed business interests. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
Full Table 4 Geographic dispersion and firm survival The table displays the results of using a Cox proportional-hazards (CPH) model to investigate the impact of a firm's geographic dispersion at the time of going public on the probability of post-IPO failure. The sample includes newly listed firms in the US stock market from 1994 to 2012. Business Concentration is calculated using a normalized Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). High CONC is 1 if a firm's business concentration level as measured by HHI is above the sample median, otherwise 0. GEOSIMILAR measures the degree of similarity of a firm's geographic dispersion within its industry; GEOCORR measures to what extent a firm's economic activities are correlated with local economic shocks. Surviving firms are defined as those continuing to trade at the end of our tracking period (i.e. the end of 2017) (CRSP delisting code 100); acquired firms are those that are delisted for reasons such as M&A (CRSP delisting codes between 200 and 299); failed firms are those delisted for negative reasons, such as bankruptcy and liquidation (CRSP delisting codes equal to or above 300). All regressions are controlled for year and industry effects, whose coefficients are suppressed for brevity. Z-statistics are presented in parentheses below coefficients and a hazard ratio is reported for each variable. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
(1) Table 5 Geographic dispersion and firm survival: Information and managerial social interaction The table displays the results of using a Cox proportional-hazards (CPH) model to investigate the impact of a firm's geographic dispersion in a hard information environment, and the population of the firm's headquarters county on the probability of post-IPO failure. The sample includes newly listed firms in the US stock market from 1994 to 2012. Business Concentration is calculated using a normalized HerfindahlHirschman Index. We define firms as operating in a hard information environment if the average change of distance at industry level (3-digit) between borrowers and lenders is above the sample median; otherwise, it is a soft information environment. A small (or large) community is defined by whether the population of the firm's headquarters county is below (or above) the sample median. Surviving firms are defined as those continuing to trade at the end of our tracking period (i.e. the end of 2017) (CRSP delisting code 100); acquired firms are those that are delisted for reasons such as M&A (CRSP delisting codes between 200 and 299); failed firms are those that are delisted for negative reasons, such as bankruptcy and liquidation (CRSP delisting codes equal to or above 300). All regressions are controlled for year and industry effects, whose coefficients are suppressed for brevity. Z-statistics are presented in parentheses below coefficients and a hazard ratio is reported for each variable. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
(1) Table 6 Post-IPO operating performance The table displays the results of investigating the impact of a firm's geographic dispersion on post-IPO operating performance. The sample includes newly listed firms in the U.S. stock market from 1994 to 2012. Business Concentration is calculated using a normalized Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. High CONC is 1 if a firm's business concentration level as measured by HHI is above the sample median, otherwise 0. The growth of the IPO firm's post-operating performance is calculated as the change of operating return on assets between the offering year and year y less the corresponding change for the matching firm, where operating return on assets is measured as the ratio of operating income before depreciation to total assets. Panel A reports the univariate analysis results; and Panel B shows the results from using ordinary least squares regressions. The post-IPO operating performance measure is winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. All regressions include control variables used in baseline regression analysis, as well as year and industry dummies. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The t-statistics are included in parentheses and are reported for heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
Panel A Univariate analysis
(1) (2) Diff. in means (1) Table 7 Headquarters size and firm survival The table displays the results of using a Cox proportional-hazards (CPH) model to investigate the impact of the level of business concentration around the firm headquarters on the probability of post-IPO failure. HQ% is the ratio of a firm's HQ state counts to all state citations in the Form 10-K, which measures the degree to which an IPO firm operates its business around its headquarters location. Surviving firms are defined as those continuing to trade at the end of our tracking period (i.e. the end of 2017) (CRSP delisting code 100); acquired firms are those delisted for reasons such as M&A (CRSP delisting codes between 200 and 299); failed firms are those delisted for negative reasons, such as bankruptcy and liquidation (CRSP delisting codes equal to or above 300). All regressions are controlled for year and industry effects, whose coefficients are suppressed for brevity. Z-statistics are presented in parentheses below coefficients and a hazard ratio is reported for each variable. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
Coefficient Table 8 Geographic dispersion and firm survival: Controlling for high-tech firms The table displays the results of using a Cox proportional-hazards (CPH) model to investigate the impact of a firm's geographic dispersion on the probability of post-IPO failure, controlling for high-tech industries. High-tech takes a value of 1 if the firm operates in a high-tech industry, otherwise it is 0. The sample includes newly listed firms in the U.S. stock market from 1994 to 2012. Surviving firms are defined as those continuing to trade at the end of our tracking period (i.e. the end of 2017) (CRSP delisting code 100); acquired firms are those delisted for reasons such as M&A (CRSP delisting codes between 200 and 299); failed firms are those delisted for negative reasons, such as bankruptcy and liquidation (CRSP delisting code equal to or above 300). All regressions are controlled for year and industry effects, whose coefficients are suppressed for brevity. Z-statistics are presented in parentheses below coefficients and a hazard ratio is reported for each variable. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
(1) Table 9 Geographic dispersion and firm survival: Controlling for industrial and international diversifications The table displays the results using a Cox proportional-hazards (CPH) model to investigate the impact of a firm's geographic dispersion on the probability of post-IPO failure, controlling for industrial and international diversifications. The sample includes newly listed firms in the US stock market from 1994 to 2012. Business Concentration is calculated using a normalized HerfindahlHirschman Index. IndustrySEG is the number of industries in which a firm is involved. Intl.SEG is the number of geographic segments of a firm. Surviving firms are defined as those continuing to trade at the end of our tracking period (i.e. the end of 2017) (CRSP delisting code 100); acquired firms are those delisted for reasons such as M&A (CRSP delisting codes between 200 and 299); failed firms are those delisted for negative reasons, such as bankruptcy and liquidation (CRSP delisting codes equal to or above 300). All regressions are controlled for year and industry effects, whose coefficients are suppressed for brevity. Z-statistics are presented in parentheses below coefficients and a hazard ratio is reported for each variable. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Table 10 Propensity score matching The table displays the results of using propensity score matching to investigate the impact of geographic dispersion of firms on the probability of post-IPO failure. We divide the sample into low-and high-concentration business groups: firms belong to the high-concentration group if their HHI-based geographic-dispersion measure is above the median value; otherwise, they belong to the low-concentration group. The variables used for the matching process include Firm age, Initial return, Proceeds, Venture capital, Underwriter, Auditor, Sales, Leverage, Profitability, Market-to-book, Intl.SEG, IndustrySEG, year and industry dummies. Surviving firms are defined as those continuing to trade at the end of our tracking period (CRSP delisting code 100); acquired firms are those delisted for reasons such as M&A (CRSP delisting codes between 200 and 299); failed firms are those delisted for negative reasons, such as bankruptcy and liquidation (CRSP delisting codes equal to or above 300). Z-statistics are presented in parentheses below coefficients. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
ATET
High-concentration vs. Low-concentration firms -0.074**
(1 vs. 0) (-2.27)
Observations 2039 Table 11 Geographic dispersion and firm survival: Alternative dispersion measures The table displays the results of using a Cox proportional-hazards (CPH) model to investigate the impact of a firm's geographic dispersion on the probability of post-IPO failure using alternative measures. The sample includes newly listed firms in the US stock market from 1993 to 2012. NState is the number of states in which an IPO firm has geographically dispersed business interests as mentioned in the Form 10-K. Region is a count variable indicating the number of different regions in which the firm has dispersed business interests. Local takes a value of 1 if a firm's business interests are in one or two states only, otherwise 0. Concentration(GDP) is a GDP-weighted normalized HHI. Concentration(Subs) is the HHI index calculated using firm's subsidiaries as reported in Exhibit 21 of Form 10-K. All regressions are controlled for year and industry effects, whose coefficients are suppressed for brevity. Z-statistics are presented in parentheses below coefficients and a hazard ratio is reported for each variable. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
(1) (2) (3) (4) The ratio of total debts to total assets in the IPO year. Profitability
The ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) to total assets in the IPO year.
Market-to-book
The ratio of a firm's market value to its book value in the IPO year. Operating return on assets The ratio of operating income before depreciation to total assets. IPO failure A dummy variable taking value 1 if a firm is delisted due to negative reaons within five years after lisiting, otherwise 0.
Appendix B Correlation matrix
The Appendix D Geographic dispersion and firm survival: AFT and Logit models The table displays the results of using Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) and logit models to investigate the impact of a firm's geographic dispersion on the probability of post-IPO failure. The sample includes newly listed firms in the U.S. stock market from 1994 to 2012. Business Concentration is calculated using a normalized HerfindahlHirschman Index. Surviving firms are defined as those continuing to trade at the end of our tracking period (i.e. the end of 2017) (CRSP delisting code 100); acquired firms are those delisted for reasons such as M&A (CRSP delisting codes between 200 and 299); failed firms are those delisted for negative reasons, such as bankruptcy and liquidation (CRSP delisting codes equal to or above 300). All regressions are controlled for year and industry effects, whose coefficients are suppressed for brevity. Z-statistics are presented in parentheses below coefficients, and a time ratio is reported for each variable (for the AFT model only). One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
(1) and logit models to investigate the impact of a firm's geographic dispersion on the probability of post-IPO failure within five years of listing. The sample includes newly listed firms in the U.S. stock market from 1994 to 2012. Business Concentration is calculated using a normalized Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Surviving firms are defined as those continuing to trade up to five years after listing (CRSP delisting code 100); acquired firms are those delisted for reasons such as M&A (CRSP delisting codes between 200 and 299); failed firms are those delisted for negative reasons, such as bankruptcy and liquidation (CRSP delisting codes equal to or above 300). All regressions are controlled for year and industry effects, whose coefficients are suppressed for brevity. Z-statistics are presented in parentheses below coefficients. A hazard ratio (or time ratio for the AFT model) is reported for each variable for the CPH (AFT) model. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Appendix F Geographic dispersion and firm survival: consider state fix effect The table displays the results of using CPH, Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) and logit models to investigate the impact of a firm's geographic dispersion on the probability of post-IPO failure by specifically considering state fix effect. The sample includes newly listed firms in the U.S. stock market from 1994 to 2012. Business Concentration is calculated using a normalized Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Surviving firms are defined as those continuing to trade up to five years after listing (CRSP delisting code 100); acquired firms are those delisted for reasons such as M&A (CRSP delisting codes between 200 and 299); failed firms are those delisted for negative reasons, such as bankruptcy and liquidation (CRSP delisting codes equal to or above 300). All regressions are controlled for year, industry and state effects, whose coefficients are suppressed for brevity. Z-statistics are presented in parentheses below coefficients. A hazard ratio (or time ratio for the AFT model) is reported for each variable for the CPH (AFT) model. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
CPH
